Enriching radically enactive cognitive science by Hutto, Daniel D
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2014 
Enriching radically enactive cognitive science 
Daniel D. Hutto 
University of Wollongong, ddhutto@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hutto, Daniel D., "Enriching radically enactive cognitive science" (2014). Faculty of Law, Humanities and 
the Arts - Papers. 1851. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1851 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Enriching radically enactive cognitive science 
Abstract 
The sciences of mind have taken a decisively embodied, enactive turn, exploring the possibility that 
thinking may occur in action and not only in the head or the brain. The embodied cognition movement, 
which first established itself in the early 1990s, has matured into a flourishing research program with 
many branches. Embodied cognition has come of age. Even traditionalists who view this program with 
skepticism admit embodied cognitive science is now a force to be reckoned with, one that: "is sweeping 
the planet" [1, p. 619] and "has become an industry" [2, p. 1]. The main driver of its growth is a continuous 
stream of empirical findings that provide "substantial evidence in support of the pervasive occurrence of 
embodied cognition" [3, p. 80]. It is now beyond serious dispute that cognition is embodied in important 
and surprising ways. 
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The sciences of mind have taken a decisively embodied, enactive 
turn, exploring the possibility that thinking may occur in action 
and not only in the head or the brain.  
The embodied cognition movement, which first established 
itself in the early 1990s, has matured into a flourishing research 
program with many branches. Embodied cognition has come of 
age. Even traditionalists who view this program with skepticism 
admit embodied cognitive science is now a force to be reckoned 
with, one that: “is sweeping the planet” [1, p. 619] and “has 
become an industry” [2, p. 1]. The main driver of its growth is a 
continuous stream of empirical findings that provide “substantial 
evidence in support of the pervasive occurrence of embodied 
cognition” [3, p. 80]. It is now beyond serious dispute that 
cognition is embodied in important and surprising ways.  
It is agreed that the mind is embodied. But there is 
philosophical work to be done. Despite the consensus that 
embodied cognition must be taken seriously, there is continued 
disagreement about its nature. Three main frameworks have 
emerged. At one extreme are ‘replacement’ views of embodied 
cognition [4]. Replacement accounts characterize cognition as 
essentially a kind of solicited organismic activity that occurs in 
the form of sensitive interactions stretching across the brain, 
body and environment [5-9]. Originally inspired by scientific 
developments in robotics [10], dynamical systems theory [11] 
and ecological psychology [12, 13], the basic idea of cognition 
as embodied activity finds philosophical support from the 
phenomenological, American naturalist and Buddhist traditions 
of thought. The distinguishing feature of all replacement 
approaches is their opposition to the mainstream view that 
cognition essentially involves the collection and transformation 
of information in order to represent the world; fundamentally 
they challenge accounts of cognition that “take representation as 
their central notion” [14, p. 172], seeking to move away from the 
idea that the primary and defining work of minds is always that 
of representing and computing.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum there are ‘conservative’ 
accounts of embodied cognition that see no need for any major 
revisions in our thinking about cognition. These accounts 
attempt to accommodate recent findings about the role of 
embodiment in cognition while still conceiving of cognition as 
wholly representational and entirely brainbound. They do so by 
positing representations with special formats that represent 
features of the body, these types of representation play a much 
larger and more fundamental role in cognition that was 
previously supposed [15, 2, 3]. Importantly, embodied cognition 
theorists of this stripe assume that the real work of cognition is 
to manipulate representations in the brain, and that it is only such 
manipulation which cognitively informs and guides what is done 
or experienced. In direct contrast to replacement theories, these 
conservative views of embodied cognition leave the mainstream 
representationalist framework entirely intact. 
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Between these two extremes are ‘hybrid’ accounts. Hybrid 
accounts are unlike replacement accounts in positing sparse 
inner models in the brain that, for example, do predictive coding 
work. They assume that special kinds of minimal, action-
oriented, representations play a part in this modeling activity, 
helping to drive and steer dynamic and extended cognitive 
processes [16, 17, 18]. Action-oriented representations are 
hypothesized to be content-bearing states or processes whose 
functional role is to indicate the presence of, and to sometimes 
‘stand in’ for, states of affairs in order to guide and direct 
specific kinds of action. Action-oriented representations are 
interestingly different from standard representations is that their 
vehicles need not be wholly neural and brainbound. This gives 
hybrid accounts scope to assume that cognitive vehicles and 
processes reach across brain, body and environment [19, 20, 21, 
22]. In this respect, unlike conservative accounts, hybrid 
accounts can put appropriate emphasis on “the profound 
contributions that embodiment and embedding make” [20, p. 
45]: they seemingly offer the best of both worlds. 
This presentation will prepare the ground for an enriched 
understanding of embodied cognition: one that will reveal just 
how embodied it is and just how it is embodied. Ultimately, I 
will argue that once unified replacement approaches, despite 
some familiar objections, have all that is needed to do the 
necessary enriching work.  
In making my case I will highlight a recognized danger – call 
it the Retention Worry – that many applications of embodied, 
enactive cognition, (with headline cases in psychology, 
psychiatry and sports science) are ‘missing the point’ [23, p. 1]. 
The Retention Worry arises for any account of embodied 
cognition that retains too much traditional thinking about the role 
of mental representations in cognition, for such accounts “fail to 
successfully motivate any role for the body or environment, let 
alone the one identified in the research” [23, p. 2].  
The Retention Worry clearly applies to conservative accounts. 
This is because those accounts regard representations as taking 
up the entire explanatory burden, of playing the Complete role, 
in cognition. By focusing wholly on the manipulation of internal 
representations in the brain such accounts unnecessarily 
complicate our understanding of how agents actively solve 
problems in real time without providing any explanatory gain. 
Worse still, such accounts obscure the ways in which agents 
apparently actively and directly marshal bodily and 
environmental resources in completing cognitive tasks.  
It may look as if hybrid accounts can easily address the 
Retention Worry. But that will be so only if such accounts are 
right in assuming representations do play an important if limited 
role in embodied cognition. Replacement theorists give reason to 
doubt this, observing that: “despite the fact that one can cook up 
a representational story … the representational gloss does not 
predict anything about the system’s behaviour that could not be 
predicted by dynamical explanation alone” [8, p. 77]. 
Although the replacement views completely escape the 
Retention Worry, they face a counter concern – namely, that 
they mistakenly fail to acknowledge the need for mental 
representations. Hybrid theorists argue that in denying any 
explanatory role for mental representations replacement accounts 
are “unworkable” [24, p. 36]. Against this backdrop it is clear 
that today’s most promising accounts of enactive, embodied 
cognition pull in opposite directions over the issue of mental 
representations. This topic is the central focus of this 
presentation. Only by clarifying what, if any, role representations 
play in cognitive science explanations will we gain a deeper, 
enrich understanding of the nature of embodied cognition.  
The Retention Worry raises burning questions: How much 
representing is too much? Do representations play an 
explanatory role in embodied cognition? And, if so, how much 
of a role and what kind of a role? This presentation will examine 
three possible answers: No role; Limited role; or Complete role. 
Against the backdrop of the Hard Problem of Content, it will 
also consider two different kinds of explanatory roles talk of 
mental representations might play [25]. Mental representations 
might be understood literally or fictionally [26]. On the first 
view representations exist and play a part in causally explaining 
behavior. On the second view, mental representations do not 
literally exist but positing them may still play some other crucial 
explanatory role. 
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